The Coalition for the Common Good Faces Deepening Paralysis as Independent Director Departs Amid Bitter University Feud

The Coalition for the Common Good (CCG) is careening deeper into an administrative crisis following the departure of its sole independent director, Lynn Pasquerella. Pasquerella, who also serves as the president of the American Association of Colleges and Universities, officially concluded her term on September 30, leaving an already fractured organization without a neutral governing voice. Her exit reduces the CCG board to an even eight members, split squarely between representatives from Antioch University and Otterbein University—the two founding institutions of the coalition.

This structural stalemate threatens to paralyze the organization indefinitely. Under CCG bylaws, critical governance actions—including the confirmation of a new independent director—require a six-vote supermajority. Given the escalating hostilities between Antioch and Otterbein, securing the requisite consensus appears increasingly improbable. What was originally conceived in 2023 as an innovative higher education network designed to pool resources, streamline operations, and foster collaborative programming has instead devolved into a high-stakes legal and governance battle. The unfolding crisis exposes the inherent vulnerabilities of multi-institutional coalitions when trust erodes, threatening the operational stability and institutional autonomy of its member universities.

A Chronology of Conflict: From Coalition to Courtroom

The tensions underlying the CCG framework broke into the open earlier this year, culminating in active litigation by late summer. The timeline of the dispute highlights a rapid deterioration of relations between the founding partners:

• 2023: Ohio-based Antioch University and Otterbein University officially form the Coalition for the Common Good, creating an innovative framework to share administrative burdens and align strategic goals. Lynn Pasquerella is appointed as the coalition’s first and only independent board director.
• May 20, 2024: Citing mounting professional scheduling demands, Pasquerella initially submits her resignation to CCG leadership but agrees to stay on through a transition period ending September 30.
• August 2024: The CCG board votes to dissolve the Antioch Advisory Board of Governors—the body responsible for overseeing Antioch’s internal operations alongside a designated standing committee of CCG board members. Antioch leaders immediately challenge the move, arguing it violates coalition bylaws requiring standing committee sign-off on major structural changes. Antioch’s board initiates legal action, though an Ohio state court initially dismisses the suit due to a lack of standing by the institutional board.
• September 2024: A member of the Antioch standing committee on the CCG board refiles the lawsuit, successfully establishing legal standing. Meanwhile, Pasquerella’s transition period officially concludes on September 30, setting the stage for her formal departure.
• October 21, 2024: An Ohio court rules in favor of Antioch, issuing a preliminary injunction that blocks the CCG from dissolving the Antioch board or unilaterally terminating Antioch President Lori Varlotta. However, the court allows a technicality: CCG can place Varlotta on paid administrative leave because coalition bylaws do not explicitly forbid it.
• October 22, 2024: Antioch issues a public statement disputing CCG’s interpretation of executive authority, warning that sidelining Varlotta jeopardizes institutional accreditation and conflicts with the spirit of the court’s protection of Antioch’s independence.
• Late October 2024: CCG board chair Dan Gifford receives formal confirmation that Pasquerella’s resignation is complete. Simultaneously, Antioch Board Chair Steve Crandall publishes an open letter urging Pasquerella to intervene, an appeal she ultimately declines because her term has ended.
• Early November 2024: The CCG board passes a formal resolution ratifying Varlotta’s placement on paid administrative leave, further cementing the divide between coalition leadership and Antioch administrators.

The Fault Lines: Authority, Accreditation, and Executive Leave

At the heart of the legal battle is a fundamental disagreement over institutional sovereignty versus centralized coalition authority. When the CCG board voted to dissolve Antioch’s Advisory Board of Governors, it ignited fears among Antioch stakeholders that their century-old institution would lose its independent identity and self-governance.

The subsequent court ruling provided a mixed verdict that failed to resolve the underlying power struggle. While the Ohio court decisively blocked the CCG from unilaterally terminating Antioch President Lori Varlotta or interfering with the university’s institutional accreditation, it carved out a narrow exception permitting her placement on paid administrative leave. This loophole has been aggressively exploited by CCG leadership.

John Comerford, who serves concurrently as the president of Otterbein University and the president of the CCG, has strongly asserted executive control over staffing and operational decisions. Following the October court ruling, CCG officials maintained that the coalition president possesses the requisite authority to manage personnel matters across member institutions.

Antioch leadership has fiercely rebuked this stance. In communications released following the court’s decision, Antioch representatives characterized CCG’s assertions as entirely false, arguing that while the court acknowledged a technical pathway for the CCG board to enact a leave of absence, it never granted sweeping unilateral personnel powers to the coalition president. Furthermore, Antioch officials note that sidelining Varlotta—who assumed the university’s presidency in fall 2025—disrupts crucial relationships with regional and programmatic accreditors, directly undermining the institutional independence the court sought to protect.

The Plea to the Independent Director

Before her departure became absolute, Antioch Board Chair Steve Crandall made a final, public appeal to Lynn Pasquerella. In an open letter, Crandall implored the veteran higher education leader to leverage her unique position on the CCG board to broker a compromise.

"Your independent position on the CCG Board gives you an opportunity to encourage a fresh look at the choices ahead and help both universities move toward a resolution," Crandall wrote, emphasizing that Varlotta enjoys unanimous support across Antioch’s governing boards, faculty, and student bodies. Crandall argued that maintaining Varlotta on paid administrative leave—despite a lack of support for her termination—serves no functional purpose other than draining Antioch’s finite financial and operational resources.

However, Pasquerella’s response dashed hopes for an internal mediation. In a statement addressing her departure, she confirmed that the conclusion of her term stripped her of any institutional leverage required to influence board dynamics. "I continue to care deeply about Antioch and its educational mission," Pasquerella stated. "I sincerely hope the parties can find a constructive path forward that protects the university’s interests, supports its students and employees, and allows Antioch to focus on its future."

Broader Implications for Higher Education Consortia

The breakdown of the Coalition for the Common Good serves as a cautionary tale for higher education administrators nationwide. In an era marked by demographic headwinds, financial pressures, and rising operational costs, colleges and universities are increasingly looking toward formal partnerships, shared service agreements, and multi-institutional coalitions as a survival strategy.

The underlying premise of these structures is the pooling of administrative overhead, academic offerings, and financial assets to achieve economies of scale. However, the Antioch-Otterbein experiment illustrates the profound legal and cultural hazards inherent in such arrangements. When participating institutions possess vastly different governance cultures, or when power is concentrated within a centralized coalition apparatus, systemic friction can quickly escalate into existential crises.

For Antioch, the ongoing dispute consumes valuable administrative bandwidth and financial capital—resources that would otherwise be directed toward student enrollment, academic programming, and institutional advancement. For Otterbein and the broader CCG framework, the public nature of the litigation and the immobilization of the board signal a governance failure that could deter prospective member institutions from joining the network in the future.

Furthermore, the involvement of accrediting bodies adds another layer of regulatory vulnerability. Higher education accreditation is tightly bound to institutional autonomy and stable, recognized leadership. When a centralized coalition attempts to dissolve a member university’s governing board or sideline its president without broad consensus, it invites heightened scrutiny from accreditors who demand proof of sound financial and administrative oversight.

As the legal proceedings continue to wind their way through the Ohio judicial system, the immediate future of the Coalition for the Common Good remains precarious. With an evenly divided board incapable of securing the supermajorities necessary to appoint a new independent director or enact sweeping strategic reforms, the coalition risks becoming a permanent monument to administrative deadlock rather than a beacon of collaborative innovation.